In 1976, Mark Blaug edited a volume entitled The Economics of the Arts. I do not know whether this was before he met Ruth, or whether he met her because of the book, or because, like in the old times, he became enamored with the singer she used to be, but what I certainly know, is that Mark loved Ruth. One day, sitting at a dinner with him, I dared a remark on Ruth, and he almost jumped on me to defend her. I do not remember what I had said, I am sure it was nothing obnoxious, but still, it made him jump. I wanted to start with this very innocent recollection, which I will never forget, and offer Ruth my deepest sympathy for the loss of a great friend, a great husband, and a great scientist. Yit 'gadal v'yit'kadash sh'mei raba (Amen) .
The papers that he edited in this book will also tell us something about what he thought at the time. Blaug's book was indeed published just one year before the first volume of the Journal of Cultural Economics came out in 1977, and long before the field received international recognition with Throsby's (1994) paper in the Journal of Economic Literature, the more recent book by Benhamou (2000) , translated into several languages, and the Handbooks by Towse (2003) , and Ginsburgh and Throsby (2006) . 1 I will also discuss what Blaug covers in his 2001 paper, published 25 years after his Economics of the Arts.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that Blaug's (1976) title contains the word art, but not the word culture. Throsby's (1994) title is more confusing. It contains both words, since it is concerned with the production and consumption of the arts, but the view it gives is about cultural economics. Benhamou's (2000) book as well as Towse's (2003) handbook avoid the word art, while the other later handbook has again both, though I would have preferred to avoid culture. The title of Blaug's (2001) paper is referring to cultural economics. Does this matter? I think it does, and will try to stick out my neck and show why I think it does, though what we are supposed to study is far from being well defined.
In Sections 1 and 2, I will discuss Blaug's two incursions into art or cultural economics. Section 3 is devoted to what happened to the field in the late 2000. Section 4 expands on what Blaug had already suggested: our field is not very inventive. Most "big" ideas come from elsewhere. We exploit the gold mines discovered by others, and until now, we have not done much that has filtered into other subfields of economics. Section 5 tries to go back to the economics of the arts where we started, and asks whether what we are doing now corresponds to what I believe Blaug would also have said or thought.
The world according to Blaug in 1976
Let me start with the first lines of the introduction of Blaug's (2001) survey:
"Cultural economics or the Economics of the Arts, as it used to be called, may be said to have been created almost de novo thirty years ago by Baumol and Bowen's (1966) book."
This excerpt settles one question, the starting point and I am quite sure that Blaug was right by choosing 1966 as birth date of the field. He did not write this sentence in his 1976 book, but the tribute paid to Baumol was clear enough, since he wrote the preface to the book, which includes also no less than three papers (out of 16) by Baumol and Bowen.
Clearly, Baumol and Bowen had looked at the "real" world to invent their "disease," but I would still qualify their contribution as theoretical, or at least conceptual. In a nutshell, today as in 1750, a quartet needs four musicians, and while there may be productivity gains in the rest of the economy, and therefore, wage increases, they will also have to be passed through to musicians. Otherwise, nobody will be attracted to become a professional musician, and quartets will disappear. If the wage increases are passed through to musicians, and since no productivity gains can be made, quartets will become too expensive to run, and will also disappear. Therefore, intervention (public or other) is needed. Many arguments have been suggested to counter this theory, which may not be as clear-cut as it was in 1966, but it still has a lot of appeal, and generated a large literature.
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Blaug's volume concentrates on two empirical issues: 3 (a) What are the reasons for which the arts should be subsidized 4 and (b) Is it possible to measure whether subsidies, if any, are efficient? These two issues "touch on almost all the outstanding problems of the performing arts and visual arts: opera, ballet, modern dance, orchestral concerts, theater, museums, and galleries, but unfortunately not television, radio and films, and not jazz or pop music." 5 The paper by Scitovksy (1972) ends with a dark remark, and a warning that appears as a watermark in most papers of Blaug's volume: "If anything is wrong with the arts, we should seek the cause in ourselves, not in our economy. I am asking you to think about it, and to think about it as consumers rather than as economists."
At the time, theory papers were rare, and with the exception of the more conceptual paper by Baumol and Bowen (1965) , which was announcing their book published in 1966, there was no theoretical paper in the 1976 volume. The problems that were found important at the time were almost only related to policy issues and to costeffectiveness analysis.
The world according to Blaug in 2001
Many papers and books appeared after the volume edited by Blaug. Some had been published before 1976, but they became important or were rediscovered in the light of later articles. Blaug deals with many of them in his 2001 paper, but since I cannot copy and paste his paper here and cite the 200 references that it contains, I will necessarily be selective and unable to cite the names of all those who strengthened the field.
Blaug distinguishes the following topics in which he considers that progress was made: (a) taste formation and rational choice, (b) demand and supply in art markets, (c) industrial organization and art institutions, (d) art markets and the estimation of returns, (e) economic history of the arts, (f) artists' labor markets, (g) Baumol's cost disease, a never ending subject, (h) public subsidies, another lasting topic. He also cites new issues "coming just over the horizon", such as the economics of copyright, international trade in cultural goods, and culturally sustainable development.
Blaug also draws a distinction between analytical progress (elaboration and refinement of theoretical concepts) and empirical progress, but has to admit that most papers were empirical, and this has hardly changed in the more recent years.
I spent some time looking at the papers published in does not mean that researchers start with theory. They often construct a theoretical framework to "support" their empirical results-and do it as if they were clever enough to do it the other way around-but purely empirical papers would very often be rejected. This is so, even when they study, like Taylor (2012) in a very recent paper in American Economic Review, the extinction of the North American bison.
What has of course changed is econometric sophistication. This was almost absent in 1976, mainly because there were almost no data. This has changed in the meantime, but I leave it to the reader to decide whether it is authors who become more sophisticated or econometric softwares and computers that make it easy. 
The world according to the

The input of non-art economists to the economics of the arts
Blaug concludes his 2001 paper as follows:
"Cultural economics is clearly a rich area for the application of economic theory and econometric technique but what we have all been hoping for is that the field might actually suggest and promote developments that would spill over with benefit to economics outside its own domain. Has this happened? Not really but is that perhaps asking too much of a subject no older than 30 years? Certainly its progress in its brief life is nothing to be ashamed of."
Blaug is right. Nothing did spill over from art or cultural economics to economics in general. But there is worse, since many tools that we use are or have been "invented" and imported from economists who certainly have some feeling for art and culture (and sometimes wine), but whose main field of research was or is different. Most of the names that appear in Blaug's (1976) Baumol's cost disease was maybe the first case of a major contribution, but he also committed another sin with his 1986 paper where he shows that the monetary returns provided by art are smaller than those earned by investing in stocks, or bonds. This is an applied paper, but the clever remark was that the difference between the returns on art and financial markets could be interpreted as accounting for the aesthetic pleasure that is provided by looking at artworks. Baumol's contribution should however be related to two other contributions. The first is Ashenfelter's (1989) paper on wine and art auctions, which made auctions known outside of the difficult theoretical field in which they were entrenched, and made economists who were interested in the arts aware that hammer prices could be used to estimate price indices. The other paper is Rosen's (1974) article on hedonic (or implicit) prices that deals with something that was known for quite a long time, 8 but Rosen was ingenious enough to show that the simple estimation of such implicit prices by regressing observed prices on characteristics, was flawed, in the sense that, in general, the function does not allow "to recover the underlying utility and cost functions from such data alone." 9 Implicit prices emerge from the equilibrium between demand and supply on markets for characteristics. This regression of prices on characteristics was used as such in a large number of papers, including by myself, to estimate price indices over time. 10 This can of course be done, but the coefficients picked up by other characteristics than by the time dummies cannot be interpreted as prices that equate supply and demand of characteristics, though every author cites Rosen, but wrongly so, since almost none of them uses correctly what Rosen had suggested to do. 11 The other technique used to estimate returns (repeat sales regression) was also developed by statisticians who aimed at describing the price behavior of housing markets, and used later for art markets, in particular by Baumol (1986) , though he did not construct an index.
In 1981, Rosen published his celebrated superstars paper, showing that small differences in talent make for large differences in income, though I could never understand whether the result is proven or whether it is incorporated in the assumptions of the model. The paper attracted a large interest in the field of the economics of the arts, but unfortunately led to little empirical research, since it is very difficult to find a convincing variable representing talent. Though many cultural economists, in particular Alper, Throsby, Towse and Wassall, have greatly contributed to the field of artists' labor markets and incomes in the late 1980s and early 1900s, 12 an important impulsion came from Filer (1986) , another outsider, with his provocative paper in which he uses US census data to show that artists do not 8 The first contributions to hedonic pricing were empirical. See Court (1939) and Griliches (1961) . Lancaster (1966) gave to the technique its lettre de noblesse, that is its theoretical foundations by suggesting that commodities were not consumed per se, but for the combination of characteristics they are endowed with. 9 The quote is from Griliches (1990, p. 189) . 10 For surveys on auctions and on hedonic prices, see Ashenfelter and Graddy (2006) and Ginsburgh, Mei and Moses (2006) . Frey and Pommerehne (1989) were among the first to use the technique. 11 Rosen outlines a two step procedure in which the first step is to estimate a hedonic function p = f(v), to evaluate its derivatives at points corresponding to the observed values of v, and use these derivatives as prices in a system containing supply and demand functions for characteristics, paying attention to the usual identification problems in estimating simultaneous equations. This approach was used in some papers, but never in the field of art markets. 12 The first paper I could trace on artists' labor markets and earnings is by Wassal and Alper (1984) and was published before Filer's. appear to earn less than other workers with similar training and personal characteristics. The title of his paper "The starving artist-myth or reality" certainly contributed to its fame. Stigler and Becker (1977) , Becker and Murphy (1988) and Bisin and Verdier (2001) paved the way to our understanding of rationality 13 in cultural consumption and transmission, though very little has been done to bring their models to empirical applications (with the exception of Bisin and Verdier themselves).
None of these scientists belongs to what we came to call art or cultural economics; their main work was devoted to other fields. This is not fully the case with my two last, but not least, examples, whose names and papers already appear in Blaug's (1976) So was Alan Peacock. Not surprisingly, since he was also a composer, and conducted the London School of Economics Orchestra while he was teaching economics at the School. "A portrait of the artist as a young man" shows Sir Alan working on public finance, fiscal policy and public choice, while at later age, he used his vast knowledge of economics applying it to the arts. To make sure that he would know everything in the field, he also served as chair of the Scottish Arts Council, member of the Arts Council of Great Britain, and chair of a Committee on Financing the BBC. His 13 See also Frey (1997 unproductive to a productive activity, and though the aim of finding jobs for cultural economists is laudable, I do not think that theoretical physicists, mathematicians, philosophers, archeologists or students of Aramaic or Quechua would like to change their field into something that becomes "productive." Nor should they.
I doubt that Adorno and Horkheimer (1947) , Adorno (1975 ), or Arendt (1960 , and perforce, Homer, Rembrandt, Beethoven, Joyce, Borges, including "entertainment" producers such as Eisenstein or Orson Welles would agree that their art should be put in the same bag as Sony's last video game, or compared to the food that is served by next doors Pizza House. And I am sure that Blaug would have agreed with me.
Let me give a less extreme but still typical example of a "commodity" produced by the "cultural" or "creative" industries, a DVD with a movie called "J'ai le droit de vivre" 16 distributed by Les Artistes Associés and Studio Canal. No brochure, just a couple of silly comments on the back cover, such as "the charm of the Fonda/Sidney couple is captivating from the beginning to the end of this big black movie." It is difficult to guess that this is a movie by Fritz Lang (who must be fully unknown by now) released in 1937 under the title "You only live once", by United Artists, though this appears on the cover of the DVD in characters for which you need a magnifying glass if you want to read them, but then, who wants to read them. Price paid: 5 euros in 2011, that is more than 70 years after the release of the movie. It would have cost ten cents to include a brochure that explains the importance Fritz Lang had on cinematographic art and would have been a manifestation of the arts to cultivate or educate people. Whether this corresponds to what Antoni Tàpies' had in mind is questionable: "A [work of art] should be something, an object vested with the mental energy of the artist, a kind of electric charge which, if touched by a spectator whose sensitivity is the appropriate one, triggers his emotions." 17 Today, the arts and culture are being confused with entertainment, the realm of "culture industries," an expression that was coined by Adorno and Horkheimer (1947) . I cannot resist in giving this long quotation from Adorno (1975) whose beautiful writing I could certainly not make any better by summarizing or paraphrasing:
"In our [Adorno and Horkheimer] drafts we spoke of 'mass culture.' We replaced that expression with 'culture industry' in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its advocates: that it is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of popular art. From the latter the culture industry must be distinguished in the extreme. The culture industry fuses the old and familiar into a new quality. In all its branches, products which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a great extent determine the nature of that consumption, are manufactured more or less according to plan. The individual branches are similar in structure or at least fit into each other, ordering themselves into a system almost without a gap. This is made possible by contemporary technical capabilities as well as by economic and administrative concentration. The culture industry intentionally integrates its consumers from above. To the detriment of both it forces together the spheres of high and low art, separated for thousands of years. The seriousness of high art is destroyed in speculation about its efficacy; the seriousness of the lower perishes with the civilizational constraints imposed on the rebellious resistance inherent within it as long as social control was not yet total. Thus, although the culture industry undeniably speculates on the conscious and unconscious state of the millions towards which it is directed, the masses are not primary, but secondary, they are an object of calculation; an appendage of the machinery. The customer is not king, as the culture industry would like to have us believe, not its subject but its object. The very word mass-media, specially honed for the culture industry, already shifts the accent onto harmless terrain. Neither is it a question of primary concern for the masses, nor of the techniques of communication as such, but of the spirit which sufflates them, their master's voice. The culture industry misuses its concern for the masses in order to duplicate, reinforce and strengthen their mentality, which it presumes is given and unchangeable. How this mentality might be changed is excluded throughout. The masses are not the measure but the ideology of the culture industry, even though the culture industry itself could scarcely exist without adapting to the masses. The cultural commodities of the industry are governed … by the principle of their realization as value, and not by their own specific content and harmonious formation. The entire practice of the culture industry transfers the profit motive naked onto cultural forms. Ever since these cultural forms first began to earn a living for their creators as commodities in the marketplace they had already possessed something of this quality. But then they sought after profit only indirectly, over and above their autonomous essence."
If only one sentence of this long citation matters, it is "The entire practice of the culture industry transfers the profit motive naked onto cultural forms."
As mentioned earlier, we now use the words markets, consumption, development, industries, entrepreneurship, business, tourism, globalization, marketing, promoting culture, entertainment, media, internet, video games, in Our field which "is located at the crossroads of several disciplines: art history, art philosophy, sociology, law, and economics and tries (or should try) to tackle questions such as why Van Gogh's paintings are expensive, and why copies of his works are cheap; why Pre-Raphaelite painters came back in the 1960s, after having been completely forgotten during almost a century (with an obvious effect on their prices); why European public or national museums are not allowed to sell parts of their collections; how the performance of museums should be evaluated; which (and given the budget constraint, how many) buildings should be saved from demolition, and kept for future generations; why the arts should be supported by the state; why there are superstars who make so much money; whether works that have been sold should nevertheless be subject to copyright laws" 21 Some of these topics may be considered productive, others not. But they are all concerned with art and culture, and much creativity is needed to analyze and understand them. Blaug, A reply (1973) 21 Ginsburgh (2001) .
